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IT’S A REVOLUTION, I SUPPOSE: THE SUPREME COURT’S
RADIOACTIVE DECISION IN VIRGINIA URANIUM,
INC. V. WARREN
“I’m waking up to ash and dust
I wipe my brow and I sweat my rust
I’m breathing in the chemicals.”1
I. IT’S TIME

TO

BEGIN: INTRODUCTION

Very little uranium is regulated in the United States.2 In fact,
according to current estimates, over ninety percent of uranium in
the country is imported.3 Uranium mining in the United States was
not regulated until the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.4 This may be
because the only known deposits were in the Four Corners Area.5
When other deposits were eventually discovered, uranium regulation only affected eight states, including Arizona, Wyoming, New
Mexico, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.6 For these states, the Court’s
recent decision in Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren7 raised not only
local awareness but also national awareness of uranium regulation.8
This case typifies the battle between state and federal government.9
Many states, like Virginia, want to maintain the right to control
their natural resources to enable protection of the environment;
conversely, the federal government has rolled back environmental
1. Imagine Dragons, Radioactive (KIDinaKORNER/Interscope Records
2012) (addressing “radioactive” postapocalyptic future of environment if consumer and corporate indifference continues). This Note will incorporate this song
and other Imagine Dragons songs as a theme.
2. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1909 (2019) (explaining alternatives to conventional uranium mining on private property).
3. Id. (detailing how much is unknown regarding uranium mining).
4. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et. seq. (1946) (providing entire Atomic Energy Act).
5. Uranium in America, URANIUM PRODUCERS OF AMERICA, http://www.theupa
.org/uranium_in_america/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2020) (recalling history of uranium
mining in America). The Four Corners includes the southwest corner of Colorado, southeast corner of Utah, northeast corner of Arizona, and northwestern
corner of New Mexico. Id. (specifying first discovered uranium deposits in U.S.).
6. See id. (enumerating states that contain uranium deposits in U.S. to date).
7. See generally Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1900 (introducing case and illustrating core issues).
8. See Andrew Chung, UPDATE 4-Virginia Ban on Uranium Mining Upheld by
U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS (June 17, 2019, 10:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-court-uranium/u-s-supreme-court-upholds-virginia-ban-on-uraniummining-idUSKCN1TI1R6 (characterizing case).
9. See id. (exemplifying conflict between state and federal government).

(307)
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protections, in turn granting access to uranium for nuclear weapons and power plants.10
This Note will discuss the implications of the Supremacy
Clause on environmental law - specifically the Virginia Uranium
Mining Ban - and its effects on both state and local governments’
justifications for regulating the mining industry.11 Part II will first
explain the uranium mining process and the facts of the case.12
This Note will then discuss a brief history of the Virginia Uranium
Mining Ban and the relevant statutes, constitutional provisions, and
case law in Part III.13 Part IV will examine the Supreme Court’s
rationale in the case.14 Part V will critically analyze the internal inconsistencies between the majority and concurring opinions and
demonstrate why the concurrence is the best approach.15 This
Note will conclude in Part VI by discussing the impact of Virginia
Uranium on the future of environmental cases by examining the dissent and how the majority and concurring opinions may create a
circuit split.16
II. WHATEVER IT TAKES: FACTS OF VIRGINIA URANIUM,
INC. V. WARREN
Uranium is a naturally occurring radioactive element - found
in rocks, soil, and water - used as a main fuel source for nuclear
power.17 It is refined through three processes.18 First, raw uranium
ore is extracted.19 Second, it is milled by “grinding the ore into
sand-sized grains and . . . exposing it to a chemical solution that
10. See id. (summarizing outcome of case).
11. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1894 (enforcing preemption precedent); see also Cale Jaffe, What Will the Supreme Court’s Decision on Virginia’s Uranium
Mining Ban Mean for Future Environmental Battles?, PAC. STANDARD MAGAZINE (June
19, 2019), https://psmag.com/environment/what-the-virginia-uranium-scotus-de
cision-means-for-environmentalists (predicting implications of case).
12. For a discussion of the facts of Virginia Uranium, see infra notes 17-39 and
accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the history of the uranium mining ban, statutory and
constitutional background, and case law, see infra notes 40-94 and accompanying
text.
14. For a discussion of the Court’s rationale, see infra notes 95-148 and accompanying text.
15. For a critique of this case, see infra notes 153-183 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact on the rest of the country, see infra notes
184-196 and accompanying text.
17. Uranium, VIRGINIA.GOV, https://www.dmme.virginia.gov/dgmr/uranium
.shtml (last visited Aug. 21, 2019) (specifying scientific characteristics of uranium).
18. See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (2019) (describing
Virginia Uranium’s plan to mine for uranium).
19. See id. (summarizing extraction process).
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leaches out pure uranium.”20 Third, the pure uranium is dried,
leaving a “yellowcake” mixture for sale, while leftovers are stored to
reduce air and water contamination.21
In 1982, Virginia implemented a ban on the uranium extraction process that remains in place today.22 The area in dispute,
known as Coles Hill, is located in Virginia and privately owned by
Virginia Energy Resources.23 Its subsidiary, Virginia Uranium, Inc.,
controls the leasehold development on the property along with the
mineral, surface, and operating rights to the area.24 Coles Hill contains the largest known uranium deposit in America.25
Since the ban, a spike in uranium prices caused Virginia Uranium’s renewed interest in the uranium extraction process, which
led the company to advocate for deregulation.26 After unsuccessfully petitioning the Virginia legislature to lift the mining ban, Virginia Uranium filed suit against the Commonwealth in federal
court.27 Virginia Uranium, Inc., Coles Hill, LLC, Bowen Minerals,
LLC, and Virginia Energy Resources, Inc. collectively filed this lawsuit in 2015 in an attempt to gain access to the Coles Hill uranium
deposit.28 The plaintiffs asserted that the Atomic Energy Act (AEA)
preempted the state mining ban through the Supremacy Clause.29
The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss Virginia Uranium’s complaint.30 In the motion, the
Commonwealth argued the AEA did not speak on the issue of uranium deposits on private land and, therefore, did not preempt Virginia law.31 Virginia Uranium then cross-filed a motion for
20. Id. (elaborating on mining process).
21. Id. (noting drying process).
22. See Uranium, supra note 17 (enumerating historical background of ban).
23. See Coles Hill, Virginia (Uranium), VA. ENERGY RES., http://www.virginiaen
ergyresources.com/s/ColesHill.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2020) (detailing demographics of Coles Hill).
24. Id. (describing extent of Virginia Energy’s ownership in Coles Hill).
25. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 2017) (recounting history of Coles Hill uranium deposit).
26. Id. at 593-94 (noting company’s interest in uranium mining).
27. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900-01 (2019) (describing
Virginia Uranium’s failures).
28. Va. Uranium, Inc., 848 F.3d at 593-94 (explaining Virginia Uranium’s argument for filing suit).
29. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1901, 1909 (detailing plaintiffs’ preemption arguments); see also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1954) (regulating nuclear power facilities).
30. Va. Uranium, Inc., 848 F.3d at 594 (affirming district court’s dismissal of
Virginia Uranium’s complaint).
31. See id. at 594 (concluding Virginia’s ban did not contradict Congress’s
objectives behind the AEA).
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summary judgment motion in response.32 The Western District of
Virginia ruled in favor of the Commonwealth and, in granting the
motion to dismiss, the court found the AEA did not extend to regulation of nonfederal uranium deposits and uranium extraction.33
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that
federal law did not preempt Virginia’s ban on uranium mining.34
The court based the majority of its analysis on the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission35 and mirrored the decision’s
reasoning.36 Virginia Uranium subsequently filed a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.37 Ultimately, the Commonwealth of Virginia was victorious.38 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal of Virginia Uranium’s suit,
holding that nothing in the AEA explicitly preempted the state’s
ban on conventional uranium mining.39
III. THE WAY THAT THINGS HAVE BEEN: A BACKGROUND
Uranium mining exploration first began in Virginia in the
1950s and was fruitful until the late 1970s and early 1980s.40 The
National Uranium Resource Evaluation (NURE) program performed studies and surveys and used samplings of Virginia’s rocks
and soil to create a mapping distribution of uranium-enriched bedrock.41 Initially, mining companies also conducted exploration
programs, which led them to discover the Swanson Deposit at Coles
Hill, Virginia.42
32. See id. (relaying case’s procedural history).
33. Id. (explaining district court’s rationale).
34. Id. at 593 (holding AEA did not preempt state regulation on uranium
mining).
35. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) (concluding Commonwealth’s statute imposing moratorium
on new nuclear plans was not preempted by AEA).
36. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 848 F.3d at 595-99 (utilizing Supreme Court’s interpretation of AEA in Pacific Gas); see also Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1903-05
(interpreting Pacific Gas and applying it to case).
37. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1900-01 (emphasizing significance of
question presented).
38. See id. at 1908-09 (agreeing with Commonwealth’s argument that state law
is not preempted).
39. Id. at 1909 (affirming Fourth Circuit’s decision that AEA’s purposes and
objectives did not contradict Commonwealth’s ban).
40. Uranium, supra note 17 (noting uranium mining’s history in Virginia).
41. See generally id. (itemizing techniques used to map uranium ore deposits in
Virginia).
42. Id. (describing explorations in Coles Hill area and giving background of
Swanson Deposit).
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Following the explorations, the Virginia legislature placed a
moratorium on uranium mining in 1982.43 According to the legislature, this was done in order to further investigate the mining process to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of Virginians.44 The
Commonwealth formed the Uranium Administrative Group (UAG)
in 1983 to conduct a cost benefit analysis of uranium mining’s effects.45 The UAG submitted a recommendation to the Virginia
Coal and Energy Commission in January of 1984 to continue oversight and expansion of the cost benefit analysis studies, which the
Uranium Task Force (UTF) then conducted.46
In its analysis, the UTF considered major monetary and nonmonetary costs of the mining, such as the effects on the industry
and the environment and increased state and local government
subsidies, weighing them against the potential employment earnings and governmental revenue benefits.47 The UTF recommended to the legislature that in order to lift the ban, milling and
tailing licenses would be required, as well as hazardous waste regulations to ensure public safety from radiation exposure.48 By the
end of 1984, however, the Coles Hill deposit was no longer practicable because uranium market prices fell globally.49 Following the
market decline, companies stopped pursuing mineral leases
altogether.50
In 2005, there was renewed interest in the Coles Hill deposit
when uranium prices increased, but the 1982 ban remained in effect.51 Virginia Uranium filed for an exploration permit in 2007 to
continue exploration efforts of the area.52 In 2008, the legislature
introduced legislation to explore the possibility of lifting the ura43. Id. (identifying bill introduced to create the uranium mining ban).
44. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 2017) (recalling
historical background of the mining ban).
45. Uranium, supra note 17 (delving into specifics of regulatory commissions
formed).
46. Id. (reciting history of cost benefit analysis studies).
47. John L. Knapp et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Mining & Milling Uranium at
the Swanson Site in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, TAYLOE MURPHY INST. xiv (Aug.
1984), https://www.dmme.virginia.gov/Uranium/pdf/Tayloe%20Murphy%20Ins
titute%20Report%20 - %20Cost - Benefit%20Analysis,%20August%201984 . pdf (reporting cost-benefit analysis of uranium mining in Virginia).
48. Va. Uranium, Inc., 848 F.3d at 593 (exploring UTF’s role); see generally
Knapp, supra note 47 (detailing results of analysis as well as necessary steps to statutorily take in order to lift ban).
49. Uranium, supra note 17 (reporting effects of global market in 1984).
50. Id. (explaining downfall of uranium mining).
51. Id. (recounting rise in uranium market).
52. Id. (stating Virginia Uranium’s request for relief at state level).
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nium mining ban in the Commonwealth.53 In January 2013, two
Virginia senators sponsored a bill to allow permits for uranium mining, yet for unknown circumstances the bill never came to fruition.54 The Virginia Uranium Mining Ban currently remains in
effect55
A. Statutory Background
In 1982, the Virginia legislature enacted Va. Code Section 45.1161.292:30, which officially banned uranium mining in Virginia.56
Under this section, in order to mine for minerals within Virginia,
the person interested in mining must first obtain a license from the
Commonwealth.57 Yet, the means to obtain a permit were made
impossible by Section 45.1-283: “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, permit applications for uranium mining shall not be
accepted by any agency of the Commonwealth . . . until a program
for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.”58 The
Commonwealth never statutorily established feasible criteria to permit uranium mining.59
Virginia Uranium addresses the state and federal conflict between the Virginia Uranium Mining Ban and the AEA.60 The AEA
originally created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in order
to “promote the ‘utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and
security and with the health and safety of the public.’”61 After
countless fatalities in World War II, where the United States utilized
two atomic bombs, Congress wanted to promote safe atomic energy
53. Id. (showing Commonwealth’s willingness to lift ban).
54. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 2017) (demonstrating Virginia Uranium’s relentless fight to lift ban).
55. See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (2019) (evidencing
Virginia Uranium’s defeat in litigation).
56. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-161.292:30 (1982) (implementing strict
standards to obtain license for mineral mines operation).
57. Id. § 45.1-161.292:20 (explaining procedures to obtain license). The statute is referring to the Department of Mines, Minerals and Energy. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 45.1-161.292:2 (1982) (defining key terms of Mineral Mine Safety Act).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-283 (1982) (deeming uranium mining to have detrimental impact on surface).
59. See Uranium, supra note 17 (illustrating timeline of ban).
60. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1901 (stating Virginia Uranium’s argument regarding AEA).
61. Summary of the Atomic Energy Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY – LAWS & REGULATIONS, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-atomic-energy-act (last
visited Aug. 28, 2019) (summarizing AEA’s purpose).
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use moving forward.62 The AEC has since been abolished, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and U.S. Department of
Energy now have authority under the AEA to fulfill the original purpose of the Act.63 One of the main implications of the AEA is that
it gives the Federal Radiation Council under the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) authority to 1) “develop guidance for federal and state agencies containing recommendations for their use
in developing radiation protection requirements” and 2) “to work
with states to establish and execute radiation protection programs.”64 This portion of the Act delineates cooperation with the
states.65 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) states “nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards.”66 There is one narrow exception in Section 2097 where
the NRC is permitted to regulate uranium mining on federal
lands.67
B. Constitutional Background
The parties’ dispute rested on their differing views about
whether the Commonwealth’s statute or federal law applies.68 The
Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law is binding on all jurisdictions and preempts state law.69 Three different types of preemption doctrines have stemmed from the Supremacy Clause: express,
62. See generally Atomic Energy Commission, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/atomic-energy-commission (offering background of atomic energy use and why Atomic Energy Act was
implemented).
63. See id. (recapping history of Atomic Energy Act).
64. Summary of the Atomic Energy Act, supra note 61 (describing authority
granted through Atomic Energy Act).
65. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1954) (outlining how AEA works with state
law).
66. Id. § 2021(k) (noting certain purposes where AEA may affect state law).
67. Id. § 2097 (making exception for uranium mining on federal land). The
federal government may regulate uranium mining through eminent domain of
private land if it wishes to control uranium ore extraction. Id. § 2096.
68. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1901-03 (2019) (analyzing
Supremacy Clause in regard to facts of this case). Virginia Uranium’s first argument is that the Supremacy Clause allows the AEA to trump Virginia law. Id. at
1901 (setting forth Virginia Uranium’s argument).
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (setting forth Supremacy Clause of United
States). “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof . . . [are] the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id. (articulating that federal law trumps state law).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

7

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3

314

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31: p. 307

field, and conflict preemption.70 Express preemption exists when
Congress explicitly states in the statute that federal law trumps state
law.71 When Congress is not explicit, field preemption may exist,
and federal law preempts state law when the law is within a field
Congress deems the federal government has exclusive control
over.72 Conflict preemption exists when state law conflicts or is inconsistent with federal law.73 Pacific Gas specifically established the
preemption analysis the Court applies to AEA preemption cases.74
C. Case Law
In Pacific Gas, the California legislature placed a moratorium
on new nuclear plant certification until the State Commission determined that a plant’s storage facilities were adequate in size to
hold the highly radioactive “spent fuel.”75 California asserted it had
authority to implement this moratorium due to economic concerns
of waste disposal.76 The central issue in the case was whether the
AEA preempted California law.77 The Court held while states have
the right to create laws for matters such as new power facilities, economic feasibility, and rates and services under the AEA, the federal
government is the sole regulator of nuclear safety concerns only relating to construction and operation of nuclear plants.78 Most notably, the Court found it “inconceivable that Congress would have left
70. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1901 (discussing preemption doctrines utilized by Court).
71. See Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1257 (1998) (defining express preemption).
72. Id. (explaining field preemption).
73. Id. (describing conflict preemption).
74. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1903-04 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)) (analyzing
preemption as it applies to uranium regulation).
75. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 195-97 (1983) (giving background of
nuclear fuel storage issues). Previously, it was believed that “spent fuel” could be
reprocessed; however, the reprocessing never occurred, thus creating a buildup of
“spent fuel.” Id. at 195 (discussing issue with accumulation of “spent fuel”). Further, there was an issue of permanent disposal, which had also never been addressed. Id. at 196 (describing issue with permanent disposal). This buildup risked
health and environmental concerns and the shutdown of nuclear reactors so the
California legislature enacted this moratorium to resolve the issue. Id. at 195-96
(explaining rationale for California state law that coincided with federal
concerns).
76. Id. at 213 (relaying California’s intent for implementing ban).
77. Id. at 198 (specifying Pacific Gas’s argument for filing suit).
78. See id. at 207 (interpreting Congress’s intent). It should be noted that the
AEA was amended in 1976 and changed the scope of the federal government’s
jurisdiction over nuclear energy. Id. at 206-07 (demonstrating legislative changes
to AEA).
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a regulatory vacuum” within the AEA and, therefore, purposefully
left other types of regulation to the states such as economic
feasibility.79
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,80 a laboratory analyst at the defendant’s plant was exposed to plutonium radiation.81 The exposure resulted in property damage and personal injuries.82 The jury
found in favor of the plaintiff in the lower court, but the circuit
court reversed the award, finding federal law preempted state law.83
The Supreme Court reversed and held the AEA did not preempt
state law in this case.84 The Court opined Congress intended for
state tort remedies to be available to “persons injured by nuclear
accidents.”85
In Skull Valley Bank of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,86 plaintiffs contested multiple Utah laws which regulated transportation of nuclear
“spent fuel.”87 Plaintiffs alleged these laws were preempted by the
AEA through the Supremacy Clause.88 The Tenth Circuit found
the rationale in Pacific Gas to be instructive, concluding that the
AEA preempted the Utah laws because they regulated radiological
safety as opposed to the stated purpose of law enforcement
regulation.89 This is a rare example of the AEA preempting state
law and shows the evolution of the Court’s application of Pacific
Gas.90
79. Id. at 208 (examining Congress’ rationale for narrowing extent of AEA).
80. 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (introducing case).
81. See generally id. at 241-44 (illustrating facts of case).
82. Id. (explaining extent of damages).
83. Id. at 245-46 (explicating tenth circuit’s rationale for its reversal). The
defendants asserted multiple federal laws, such as the Price-Anderson Act and the
Atomic Energy Act, preempted state tort law. Id. at 249, 251 (giving detailed background of claims in case). Only the analysis of the Atomic Energy Act, however, is
relevant to this case. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (2019)
(analyzing case as it pertains to Virginia Uranium).
84. Id. at 258 (holding AEA does not preempt state law’s award of punitive
damages).
85. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-52 (exploring Congress’s intent of AEA and state
law relationship through examination of its amendment in Price-Anderson Act).
86. 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (analyzing preemption doctrine).
87. Id. at 1227 (conveying facts of case).
88. Id. at 1239 (examining Supremacy Clause claim).
89. Id. at 1246 (agreeing with district court’s decision that effects of proposed
nuclear fuel storage upon health and general welfare addressed radiological concerns that are covered by federal law). This case delves into more specific analysis
of each of the Utah laws, which is not related to the Supremacy Clause analysis. Id.
at 1223 (analyzing further arguments).
90. See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1919 (2019) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (concluding case correctly applied Pacific Gas to find preemption).
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In In the Matter of Hydro Resources, Inc.,91 defendants obtained
uranium mining licenses at four sites in McKinley County, New
Mexico.92 Inventors then filed a claim with the NRC to deny the
license for one of the four sites due to concerns about radiation
contamination of that site.93 The NRC recognized it cannot regulate “conventional” uranium mining – the uranium ore extraction
process - because the AEA grants the NRC jurisdiction “at the mill,
rather than at the mine.”94
IV. YOU CAN’T FIGHT THE FRICTION: THE SUPREME COURT’S
ANALYSIS IN VIRGINIA URANIUM
On appeal, the key issue in Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren was
whether the AEA preempted the Virginia Uranium Mining Ban
under the Supremacy Clause.95 Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority
opinion, and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined in the judgment.96 The majority organized its opinion around three points
made by Virginia Uranium: 1) the AEA mandates that the NRC has
the exclusive authority to regulate uranium mining due to public
safety concerns; 2) under Pacific Gas, the Commonwealth’s ban is
barred by field preemption; and 3) under conflict preemption, the
AEA must preempt state law.97 While the concurrence – written by
Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor
- similarly analyzes Virginia Uranium’s points, it disagreed with the
broad sweeping nature of the majority, finding it unnecessary for
the purposes of this case.98
A. Majority’s Statutory Interpretation
The Court first assessed Virginia Uranium’s argument that the
way the AEA is written grants the NRC sole power to regulate uranium mining due to nuclear safety concerns.99 The Court noted
91. 63 N.R.C. 510 (2006) (presenting case).
92. Id. at 513 (providing facts of case).
93. Id. at 514 (asserting intervenors evidence for radiation contamination of
Church Rock Section 17 site).
94. Id. at 512 (exploring other regulatory authorities that control conventional mining).
95. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1901 (explaining Virginia Uranium’s reasoning for filing suit).
96. Id. at 1900-09 (concluding preemption does not apply when state law regulates uranium extraction).
97. Id. (providing organization of majority opinion); For a discussion of the
majority opinion see infra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 1909 (disagreeing with majority’s analysis).
99. Id. at 1901 (addressing Virginia Uranium’s first argument).
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that according to the AEA, specifically § 2092, the NRC can regulate “only ‘after [uranium’s] removal from its place of deposit in
nature.’”100 As a result, the first step in the uranium mining process, extraction, lies outside of the NRC’s authority.101 The majority supported this conclusion by analyzing Congressional “intent”
evidenced by a narrow exception in the AEA.102 The exception
granted the NRC power to regulate uranium mining on federal
land.103 Based on the exception, if the federal government wishes
to regulate uranium mining on private land, it may either seize private land through eminent domain or purchase the land to make it
federal.104 By creating this exception, the Court found Congress
considered uranium mining on private land and purposely did not
grant the NRC regulatory power to this type of uranium mining
through the AEA.105
The Court also focused on Congress’s amendment of subsection (k).106 It reads “[n]othing in this section [that is, § 2021] shall
be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to
regulate for activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.”107 Virginia Uranium asked the Court to interpret
this subsection to expand the AEA’s preemptive effect thereby giving the NRC authority when any state law pertains to public safety
against “radiation hazards.”108 The majority admonished Virginia
Uranium for this interpretation of subsection (k) because of the
broad sweeping implications this reading would have.109 Both state
and federal governments would be banned from regulating ura100. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1902 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (1946))
(emphasis added)) (interpreting Atomic Energy Act narrowly).
101. Id. (finding agency’s jurisdiction “takes hold only ‘at the mill, rather
than at the mine’ ”) (quoting In Re Hydro Res. Inc., 63 N.R.C. 510, 512 (May 16,
2006)).
102. Id. (examining Congressional carve out in the Atomic Energy Act).
103. Id. (applying 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (1964)).
104. Id. (explaining how federal government can regulate uranium mining
on private land).
105. See id. (narrowing NRC jurisdiction to exclude uranium mining on private land).
106. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1902 (focusing on §2021(k) of Atomic
Energy Act).
107. Id. (reciting statute to analyze its meaning).
108. Id. at 1902-03 (reprimanding Virginia Uranium for its interpretation of
Atomic Energy Act).
109. See id. at 1903 (criticizing Virginia Uranium’s interpretation). The Court
explains that in order to read the statute in the way Virginia Uranium requested,
the Court would have to take out thirteen words and add two more so that the
Statute would state, “any State or local agency may regulate activities only for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.” Id. (refusing to utilize Virginia Uranium’s interpretation).
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nium mining on the basis of radiation hazards due to the NRC’s
contention that it has no authority over private land uranium mining — Virginia Uranium also never disputed this contention.110
B. Pacific Gas Analysis of Field Preemption
The Court next weighed Virginia Uranium’s second argument
- that field preemption is required by precedent from Pacific Gas.111
Issues with this argument immediately arose because the AEA in
Pacific Gas did not preempt the California state law that banned
new nuclear power plant construction.112 Virginia Uranium originally asserted this argument to highlight that California state law
was upheld solely because its purpose was unrelated to radiation
safety hazards, but rather for economic development concerns.113
The Court, however, reasoned that in order to rule for Virginia
Uranium based on this argument, it would have to conclude that
any state law enacted for radiation safety hazards would, in turn, be
preempted.114
The Court was unwilling to adopt Virginia Uranium’s argument and further articulated its reluctance to analyze the state legislative purposes for creating this ban.115 The Pacific Gas Court
investigated legislative purpose because the AEA addressed construction of nuclear plants that overlapped with the NRC’s jurisdiction.116 Here, the Court found the AEA does not cover mining
activities, and it was unnecessary to investigate further into an activity with which the federal government could not have involvement.117 According to the Court, this would be “not only a
significant federal intrusion into state sovereignty . . . [but] also
represent a significant judicial intrusion into Congress’s authority
to delimit the preemptive effect of its laws.”118 Further, the Court
insinuated that Pacific Gas was decided incorrectly and here, the
110. Id. (detailing predicament of state and federal government if statute
read in compliance with Virginia Uranium’s interpretation).
111. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (rejecting preemption of state law); see also Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1903 (analyzing Virginia Uranium’s second argument).
112. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1903-04 (considering Pacific Gas case).
113. Id. (annihilating Virginia Uranium’s argument under Pacific Gas).
114. Id. (finding apparent flaws in Virginia Uranium’s argument).
115. Id. at 1904 (scrutinizing Virginia Uranium’s argument that Court must
look at state legislative purpose).
116. Id. (defining scope of NRC’s powers).
117. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1904 (reasoning why the Court refused to
extend its inquiry like it did in Pacific Gas).
118. Id. at 1905 (opposing Virginia Uranium’s request).
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state law’s exclusive objective was an activity left for the states —
something that never requires inquiry into legislative motive.119
The Court cited Silkwood as evidence that the Court has historically refused to overextend preemption in regard to the AEA.120
Silkwood was analogized to this case because the Court there did not
explore state legislative purpose when deciding whether state tort
law was preempted by the AEA.121 The Court agreed with its conclusion in Silkwood that this type of preemption extension fell beyond NRC authority under the AEA.122 Ultimately, the majority
decided that when addressing field preemption, the standard has
been and still should continue to be “what the State did, not why it
did it.”123
C. Conflict Preemption
Lastly, Virginia Uranium argued that the state ban may still be
invalidated through conflict preemption.124 Under conflict preemption, a state law may be preempted by federal law when it interferes with “the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”125
According to Virginia Uranium, Congress intended to balance nuclear power development against safety and environmental costs
through the AEA, and the Virginia Uranium Mining Ban upset this
balance.126 The Court rejected this argument and cited Article VI,
Clause 2 of the Constitution along with well-established case law asserting preemption must be written into the statute.127
119. See id. (explaining how § 2021(k) excludes Virginia’s law from legislative
motive analysis of preemption).
120. Id. (explaining how Court refuses to overextend in this area).
121. Id. (deciding whether preemption applied).
122. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1905-06 (analogizing Silkwood to facts of
this case). The Court in dicta detailed how dangerous it could be to investigate
into state legislative purpose when there is no clear statutory mandate. Id. (cautioning future courts). Further, it explained how difficult it can be to prove the
purpose for enacting a law due to the number of legislators there are and how it is
practically impossible to understand each of their motives for enacting a law. Id. at
1906-07 (negating legislative history deference).
123. Id. at 1905 (exemplifying case law where this standard was applied).
124. Id. at 1907 (analyzing final argument by Virginia Uranium).
125. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (explaining
conflict preemption).
126. Id. (detailing Virginia Uranium’s argument for conflict preemption).
127. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1907 (citing Constitution and case law to
determine how to establish conflict preemption). “Only federal laws ‘made in pursuance of’ the Constitution, through its prescribed processes of bicameralism and
presentment, are entitled to preemptive effect.” Id. (citing U.S. CONS. art. VII, cl.
2) (citation omitted) (explaining importance of legislature in creating federal
laws). Further, “any ‘[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose,’ whether express or implied, must therefore be ‘sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue.’ ”
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Similar to how challenging it would be to find each legislator’s
motive behind field preemption, the same can be said for conflict
preemption.128 The Court reasoned that analyzing these motives
would be a classic example of “piling inference upon inference;” by
reading into each Congressperson’s intent, the law may be applied
in a way it was not actually intended.129 The Court found that interpreting the law this way would take away from the negotiation and
compromising tactics it actually takes to get a law passed.130 Ultimately, the Court declined to speculate about this matter and decided to focus on what the text of the AEA actually states.131 For
this reason, the Court found conflict preemption did not apply in
this case.132
D. Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg began her concurrence by addressing her
contentions with the majority.133 The concurrence stated that the
majority’s analysis of legislative motive went beyond the scope of
this case.134 Further, Justice Ginsburg found the majority’s opinion
inappropriate because it focused more on Justice Gorsuch’s personal preferences rather than the opinion of the majority as a
whole.135
1. Concurrence’s Statutory Interpretation
The concurrence used a slightly different method than the majority when analyzing the statutory interpretation of the AEA
§ 2021(k).136 Instead of the formal, text-centered approach used
by the majority, the concurrence looked at the context and history
Id. (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)) (defining
when preemption may be utilized).
128. Id. at 1907-08 (detailing level or speculation associated with discerning
Congressional intent when enacting new laws).
129. Id. at 1908 (refusing to disregard legislative process by overemphasizing
Congressional intent).
130. Id. (explaining democratic process behind how Congresspersons enact
laws).
131. See id. (speculating what Congress might have meant to refute Virginia
Uranium’s argument).
132. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1909 (affirming judgment of Fourth
Circuit).
133. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing majority’s overbroad holding).
134. Id. at 1909 (restricting analysis to parameters of case).
135. See id. (giving thorough explanation of how Justice Ginsburg would resolve case).
136. See id. at 1913 (deciding Virginia Uranium’s argument is unsupported).
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of the AEA.137 Even before the enactment of the AEA, the federal
government regulated public health and safety while state governments regulated the economic and non-radiological purposes of
nuclear fuel.138 When the AEA was enacted, it was designed to give
states an elevated responsibility exempting low-risk, nuclear power
concerns from federal regulation under § 2021(k).139 Further, the
concurrence looked to House and Senate reports to confirm the
AEA was written so that states could retain authority over nuclear
fuel regulation authority.140
2. Concurrence’s Analysis of Field Preemption
The concurrence next analyzed Virginia Uranium’s argument
that the AEA should preempt Virginia law because the Pacific Gas
Court stated, “the Federal Government has occupied the entire
field of nuclear safety concerns.”141 The state law in Pacific Gas and
Silkwood were not preempted by the AEA.142 The concurrence declined to analyze the purpose behind the ban, noting such inquiry
may be appropriate in some circumstances, as in Pacific Gas, but is
not required here.143 In Pacific Gas, the purpose of the state law
related to nuclear powerplant construction which is related to economic development - not safety hazards - and, therefore, was appropriately considered in the context of preemption.144
3. Conflict Preemption
The concurrence laid out Virginia Uranium’s four arguments
for conflict preemption, only two of which are relevant to this
Note.145 The concurrence first addressed the “delicate balance” be137. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1913 (explaining federal and state responsibilities before AEA).
138. Id. (examining history to explain future application of AEA).
139. Id. (reiterating §2021(k)’s purpose when enacted).
140. Id. (quoting House and Senate reports to support conclusion that
§ 2021(k) left lower risk nuclear fuel activities to states). “Nothing suggests that
Congress ‘intended to cut back on pre-existing state authority outside the NRC’s
jurisdiction.’ ” Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 209-10) (analyzing similar case law that declined
preemption).
141. Id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 212) (contending this was
Virginia Uranium’s “strongest argument” for preemption).
142. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1913 (stating holding of Silkwood and
Pacific Gas).
143. See id. (contrasting Virginia Uranium to Pacific Gas).
144. Id. (explaining difference in state law in Pacific Gas).
145. Id. at 1912 (rebutting Virginia Uranium’s arguments). Justice Ginsburg
explains conflict preemption may not be used in this case as “an unacceptable
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
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tween nuclear power and public welfare and rejected the majority’s
analysis; instead, the concurrence highlighted the complete lack of
balance in this area of the law because conventional uranium mining on private land is statutorily left to the states.146 Next, the concurrence focused on Virginia Uranium’s argument that Congress
has the “primary purpose” to sponsor nuclear power, and Virginia’s
law stops Congress from achieving this purpose.147 In the very case
Virginia Uranium cited, however, this policy argument was dismissed because of the lack of federal regulation to suggest this is
Congress’s “primary purpose.”148
E. Dissent
According to the dissent, the state of Virginia successfully regulated the milling and drying steps of uranium mining, that are preempted by the AEA, by claiming the ban regulates “mining safety”
of the extraction process, a step not preempted by the AEA.149 Instead of trusting the mining safety argument, the dissent finds the
true purpose of the ban is actually to regulate the more harmful
steps of milling and drying.150 The dissent demonstrates that in Pacific Gas, the state was able to give a “nonsafety rationale” to the
milling and drying steps, which is the only reason the state law was
not preempted.151 Here, however, the dissent opines Virginia
never gave a non-safety reason for implementing this ban.152
V. IS IT JUST SMOKE

AND

MIRRORS? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

It is quite ironic that the concurrence found it unfitting for the
majority to write an opinion speaking for the entire Court, that
“sweeps well beyond the confines of this case[,]” instead of writing
as individuals.153 The irony in this statement comes from the maof Congress.” Id. at 1915 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563-64 (2009))
(finding no conflict between state law and Congressional purpose).
146. Id. at 1915 (analyzing and disclaiming “delicate balance” argument by
showing lack of federal regulation in uranium mining).
147. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1915 (disproving plaintiff’s argument
through case quoted by plaintiff).
148. Id. (showing Virginia Uranium lacks proof of this contention).
149. Id. at 1919 (detailing Virginia Uranium’s theory).
150. Id. (exemplifying how states may not indirectly regulate preempted
fields through Pacific Gas).
151. Id. (analogizing facts of Pacific Gas to Virginia Uranium).
152. Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1915 (distinguishing Virginia Uranium
from Pacific Gas for lack of non-safety rationale).
153. Id. at 1909 (discussing inappropriateness of majority’s field preemption
analysis).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol31/iss2/3

16

Martin: It's a Revolution I Suppose: The Supreme Court's Radioactive Dec

2020]

IT’S

A

REVOLUTION, I SUPPOSE

323

jority and the concurrence having fundamentally differing views on
the preemption doctrines, and the concurrence is therefore also
giving an individualized opinion that could have spoken for the
Court had it rendered more support.154 The majority disfavored
preemption due to strong federalist beliefs that judges should only
consider what is written in the statute, while the concurrence put
faith in Congress and its intentions when it comes to preemptive
purpose.155 The way the Justices divided in this case were along
philosophical theories of statutory interpretation.156 The more liberal Justices, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, all concurred,
while the conservative Justices, Thomas and Kavanaugh, joined
Gorsuch.157
As expected, given the ideological leanings of the Justices, the
majority took a textualist approach to preemption.158 The predominant textualist belief is that congressional intent can be found directly in the statutory text and there is no reason to inquire into
intent.159 Contrary to the majority, the concurrence seems to support a purposivism approach, although the concurrence ultimately
did not use a per se purposivism analysis – which would have required an inquiry into legislative intent.160 In cases where the text
of the statute is in conflict with its purpose, purposivism allows
judges to look past what is written in the text of the statute in order
to carry out the “spirit of the law.”161
By choosing to look at “what the state did, not why it did it,” the
majority created a new standard that has the potential to cause con-

154. See Gordon D. Todd, The Sound of Silence, THE REGULATORY REVIEW (July
12, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/12/todd-preemption-virginiauranium/ (analyzing disagreement between majority and concurrence).
155. See id. (contrasting majority and concurring Justices’ judicial beliefs).
156. See id. (discussing how Justices’ ideologies affect cases).
157. Meghan Keneally, Their Pay, Age, Political Leanings and More: 6 Supreme
Court Questions Answered, ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018, 4:43 PM), https://abcnews.go
.com/US/pay-age-political-leanings-supreme-court-questions-answered/
story?id=58204713 (explaining key questions about Supreme Court including political leanings).
158. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1900-09 (interpreting preemption
from textualist view).
159. See Jordan, supra note 71, at 1211 (explaining textualist philosophy); see
also Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1900-09 (demonstrating majority’s preemption
philosophy).
160. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1909-16 (defining preemption from
purposivism view).
161. Jordan, supra note 71, at 1205 (analyzing development of purposivism as
well as its approach).
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fusion for field and conflict preemption analyses.162 Historically,
the Court has looked to legislative motive when deciding whether
field or conflict preemption are present in the case at issue, except
in cases where states have traditionally been given deference.163 In
cases of state deference, the Court in the past rejected field and
conflict preemption unless there was “clear and manifest evidence”
that Congress intended preemption.164 Here, the majority doubted
that field and conflict preemption doctrines may ever be invoked,
even in instances of state deference.165 This is a deviation from established Court holdings within the preemption sphere, which can
be grounds for misunderstanding in lower courts in the future.166
Conversely, the concurrence is not without fault.167 The structure of the concurrence does not follow the logical structure of Virginia Uranium’s arguments.168 In this instance, the concurrence
did not find it necessary to investigate legislative intent; however,
reprimanding the majority for its legislative intent analysis is contrary to purposivism.169 For further clarification, the concurrence
should have specified when an inquiry into legislative intent is necessary in order to find field and conflict preemption.170
This case also raises even bigger issues when speculating as to
why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the first place.171 Virginia Uranium essentially asked the Court to uproot a well-established doctrine of law.172 Before the decision, some thought that
this case may be the one to change the course of the law in this
162. See Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1905 (analyzing case from holistic
standpoint).
163. Jordan, supra note 71, at 1205 (describing how Court traditionally invoked implied preemption doctrines).
164. Id. at 1214 (noting Court’s traditional analysis when deciding whether
field or conflict preemption is present).
165. Todd, supra note 154 (explaining majority’s beliefs on preemption).
166. Jordan, supra note 71, at 1151-52 (detailing precedent in context of
preemption).
167. See generally Va. Uranium, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1909-16 (concurring in
judgment).
168. Id. at 1909-16 (agreeing with majority but for different reasons).
169. Id. at 1909 (disagreeing with majority’s analysis into legislative intent); see
also Jordan, supra note 71 (explaining purposivism as applied to preemption
doctrine).
170. See Todd, supra note 154 (discussing concurrence’s reasoning).
171. See Tom McLaughlin, Opinion – Nervously Waiting, S. BOSTON NEWS & RECORD (May 16, 2019), http://www.sovanow.com/index.php?/opinion/article/ner
vously_waiting/ (speculating as to why Court heard this case).
172. Id. (explaining what favorable outcome for Virginia Uranium would require Court to do).
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area, while others were questioning how this case made it to the
Supreme Court in the first place.173
Moreover, it is clear this was not a “Republicans versus Democrats” issue, but instead an issue of “respective understanding[s] of
what it means to be a judge.”174 This is because, traditionally,
Republicans embrace states’ rights while Democrats favor federal
regulation.175 Here, however, the Justices followed their statutory
interpretation philosophies rather than their partisan beliefs.176
In a case that hinges on differing interpretation philosophies,
it is difficult to determine which opinion is “correct,” but purposivism seems like the best approach for addressing these issues.177
The ultimate goals of preemption are to ensure the judicial branch
finds the correct balance between state and federal government
without legislating from the bench.178 With these goals in mind,
purposivism better addresses preemption issues in a way that textualism would limit because of the nature of the doctrine.179 Textualism strictly focuses on the text and structure of statutes, leaving only
one way for the judicial branch to interpret preemption.180
Purposivism instead allows the judicial branch to examine Congress’s intent through interpretation that places checks and balances on the legislature, like the system of government in the U.S.
was created to do.181 Through a purposivism approach, the judicial
branch is not restricted to the confines of the statute itself and may
place themselves in the position of a “reasonable legislature.”182
Purposivism presents additional options for the judiciary because it
173. See Halle Parker, Supreme Decision: In Multi-Faceted Case that Defies Political
Stereotypes, Highest Court in Land to Hear Arguments on Uranium Mining Moratorium,
GODANRIVER.COM (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.godanriver.com/news/pittsylvania
_county/in-multi-faceted-case-that-defies-political-stereotypes-highest-court/article
_f630b634-dfb0-11e8-8e74-ebc58661f835.html (explaining background, key arguments, as well as Court vantage points); see also McLaughlin, supra note 171 (speculating as to how Supreme Court heard this case).
174. See Parker, supra note 173 (differentiating this case from others on partisan lines); see also Todd, supra note 154 (detailing differences in Justices’
philosophies).
175. See Parker, supra note 173 (noting traditional values of Republicans).
176. See generally Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (exemplifying Justices’ opinions through their judicial ideologies).
177. See Todd, supra note 154 (explaining how differing judicial philosophies
may impact cases).
178. Jordan, supra note 71, at 1215 (noting goals of preemption doctrines).
179. Id. at 1218 (demonstrating how narrowly statutes may be interpreted
through textualism).
180. Id. at 1217-18 (explaining textualism).
181. Id. at 1219 (describing how purposivism fulfills purposes of checks and
balances of Constitution).
182. Id. (applying purposivism to judiciary).
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is permitted to assess the underlying rationale of the statute and
examine the context in which it was created.183
VI. WELCOME TO THE NEW AGE: THE FUTURE
ENVIRONMENTAL PREEMPTION CASES

OF

Although this case reaffirmed Supreme Court preemption precedent, the effects of the ruling may change preemption as applied
to the environment throughout the country.184 The dissent illustrates the far-reaching impact this decision will have stating, “so
long as the State is not boneheaded enough to express its real purpose in the statute, the State will have free reign . . .” to implement
state laws similar to Virginia’s without a non-safety justification to
the milling and drying steps to do so.185 In essence, states now have
the ability to regulate radiation hazards, forbidden by the AEA,
through other AEA authorities because the majority’s opinion refuses to inquire into legislative purpose.186 Chief Justice Roberts
recommended that states, all of which already possess extensive police powers, can effectuate the same desired result through police
powers rather than “subvert[ing] Congress’s judgment on nuclear
safety.”187
This six-three ruling in favor of Virginia, with three Justices in
the majority and three in the concurrence, may potentially create a
circuit split causing some circuits to follow the majority and others
follow the concurrence.188 While the outcome was the same in this
particular case, the Justices philosophically differ in the rationale
doctrines each invoked.189 Because purposivism typically focuses
on legislative intent, the concurrence’s rationale could endorse a
more expansive outcome that favors an environmentalist agenda
183. Jordan, supra note 71, at 1219-20 (elaborating on purposivism in judiciary context).
184. See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1909 (2019) (holding
AEA does not preempt Virginia’s mining ban); see also Chung, supra note 8 (explaining potential effects of case).
185. Id. (presuming decision grants states authority beyond their reach).
186. Id. at 1919 (showing how states can get around preemption). As explained in the background, the AEA grants states the authority to “regulate activities for purposes other than protecting against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(k) (emphasis added).
187. Id. (demonstrating examples where states have used police powers to
block in-state nuclear development).
188. See id. at 1900 (differing on fundamental judicial theories).
189. See Todd, supra note 154 (explaining key differences in concurrence and
majority rationales).
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than the majority’s textualist approach.190 In contrast, the majority’s approach could limit future environmental preemption cases
in instances where Congress is silent by refusing to investigate legislative intent altogether.191
Indiana, Washington, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas all advocated on behalf of the Commonwealth during the course of the
Supreme Court litigation.192 These states warned the Court of potential implications of preemption on state environmental law, including the state hazardous waste statutes, to demonstrate their
support of states’ rights to regulation in the environmental
sphere.193 The outcome of this case, however, wavered state concerns and was a significant win for their environmental rights.194
This case may in fact provide another way for states, already fighting
against the current administration’s cuts on federal environmental
protections, to continue pushing for stricter environmental regulation.195 By implementing laws that do not overlap with federal authority, states may be able to more definitively avoid preemption
and place stricter environmental safeguards for their citizens.196
Samantha Pankey Martin*

190. See Jordan, supra note 71, at 1219 (demonstrating differences that may
result from Justices’ differing preemption philosophies). For a discussion on
purposivism see infra notes 160-183 and accompanying text.
191. See Todd, supra note 154 (expounding on majority’s view that Congressional silence on common issue should be treated as conscious choice not to
regulate).
192. Brief for Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Va.
Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (No. 16-1275) (presenting arguments in Commonwealth’s favor).
193. Id. at 2 (asserting arguments regarding detrimental effect to states if preemption applied).
194. Jaffe, supra note 11 (analyzing problems with petitioner’s argument).
195. See id. (speculating future of environmental cases).
196. See id. (inquiring into Virginia Uranium’s impact on environment’s
future).
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